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1 INTRODUCTION 
While South Africans were frantically negotiating the interim Constitution 
and establishing the framework for the final Constitution in 1993, world 
trade negotialOrs were rounding off the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
which would establish the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and expand the 
existing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in goods to services 
and intellectual property. On 15 December 1993 the negotiators completed 
the final touches to the WTO agreement; on exactly the same day the 
negotiators in South Africa finalised the interim Constitution.' Barely two 
weeks before the first democratic elections in South Africa on 27 April 1994, 
the Marrakesh Agreement, establishing the WTO, was signed on 15 April 
1994 by 123 nations including South Africa. 
The proximity of birth of two important new regimes in governance, 
the question of how the two interrelate. At the same time that the interim 
Constitution was establishing for the first time the sovereignty of the South 
African people, the new international trade order was signalling a significant 
milestone in world governance which reduces national sovereignty. As 
Cameron and Campell euphemistically put it: 
"The WTO inherently limits state sovereignty, as states are required to conduct 
their affairs with other states in mind. ,,2 
The broad question that is posed in this paper is what is the fit between new 
constitutional order and the WTO obligations that South Africa has under-
taken. In particular three issues are addressed. 
First, how does the undertaking of WTO obligations fit into South Africa's 
new democratic form of governance? 
how does the constitutional dispersal of powers between spheres 
and within spheres affect South Africa's WTO obligations? Because South 
Africa has been decentralised into "spheres of government" - at national. 
provincial and local level the impact of WTO obligations on the federal 
features in the Constitution should be examined. The converse is equally 
I The Constitution of the RepublIc of South Africa 1993 Act 200 of 1993. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
important; how do, or should, WTO obligations impact on intergovernmental 
relations and co-operative government between the spheres? 
Third, are certain WTO obligations compatible with values and mandates 
imposed by the Constitution? In particular, could the affirmative action policy 
with respect of government procurement be affected by WTO obligations? 
2 THE WTO AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
The first question concerns sovereignty; how is membership of the WTO 
married to South Africa's new found democracy? When the Marrakesh 
Declaration was signed on 15 April 1994 by Derek Keys, the Finance Minister 
of the last apartheid government, two weeks before the interim Constitution 
took effect of 27 April, the constitutional law, as at it then stood, required no 
further act of ratification as South Africa was bound by the agreement.' 
Although the African National Congress (ANCl, the new government in-
waiting, was in full agreement with South Africa's accession to the WTO and 
was part of the South African delegation to Marrakesh, it was not politically 
wise to bind the new South Africa by an agreement of such magnitude 
without the participation and approval of the new institutions of democracy. 
In a pragmatic move, the WTO Agreement was taken to the new Parliament 
for a formal act of ratification, which was duly done in March 1995. 
The same procedure has to be followed under the 1996 Constitution' for 
any further agreements that are bound to follow. There are a few areas of 
unfinished business from the Uruguay Rounds, such as the agreement on 
telecommunications and trade in financial services. Renegotiations of the 
detail of the Agreements are also built into the WTO system. 
In November 1998 the schedule of specific commitments made by South 
Africa on financial services under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (the GATS) were submitted for ratification to the joint parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry and Finance. At issue was the 
Fifth Protocol to the GATS which had to be ratified by members before 29 
January 1999. Following a report of the Committee, recommending the 
adoption of South Africa's offers, it was approved by the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces. 
It should be noted that the National Council of Provinces can play an 
important, and independent, role in the ratification process. Unlike its limited 
role in vetoing legislation, the I''-Jational Assembly can always override 
its rejection by a two third majority,' the National Council has a veto power 
with regard to the ratification of international treaties. The Constitution is 
clear: 
3 S 6(3)(e) Republic of South Africa Constitution Act I 10 of 1983. See Dugard, John (1998) 
"Public International Law:" in M Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa chapter 
13 (Revision Service 2) (Cape Town Juta). 
4 S 23 I (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 Act 108 of 1996 
(hereinaFter reFerred ro as the Constitution). 










































GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
"An international binds the Republic only after it has been approved bl 
resolution in both National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces" 
This veto power could be significant where WTO commitments to by 
the national executive, impact adversely on provincial interests, 
Asserting the role of Parliament of giving the final approval to an agree-
ment is important, It was, after all, the claim of the United States Congress 
that it, rather than the President, approves the establishment of the Interna-
tional Trade Organisation in 1948, that scuppered the establishment of that 
organisation.' While parliamentary sovereignty appears sound in theory the 
practice looks different, Parliament is confronted with an all-or-nothing 
choice; it must either approve or disapprove an agreement, There is no scope 
for tinkering with the details of an agreement, because those details are the 
product of complex and interlinked negotiations, Should Parliament have 
rejected the offer on financial services because it did not agree with, say, one 
aspect of the insurance commitment. the entire package of commitments 
would have followed suit. 
Because of the impossible choice imposed on it, Parliament has insisted on 
being informed earlier in the negotiation process, In 1998 the parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry was playing an active role in 
respect of bi-Iateral agreements, With the negotiations of the South Africa-
European Union Free Trade Agreement the Portfolio Committee has made 
a number submissions to the trade negotiations, 
In respect of the WTO, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has 
brought offers to the attention and approval of the Portfolio Committee on 
Trade and Industry, At present the negotiations on the telecommunications 
have commenced - unfinished business from the Uruguay Round, At issue 
is the reduction in tariffs on Information Technology (In where negotiations 
seek to secure zero tariffs by the year 2000, The OTI is seeking to get a 
mandate from Parliament for its negotiating position, 
With multi-lateral agreements it is of course more difficult for Parliament 
to play the same interventionist role, However, as the locus of sovereignty it 
is duty-bound to seize the initiative to play an active role in shaping foreign 
trade policy, rather than be confronted with ajalt accompli of a negotiated 
deal which leaves it with little or no choice, 
3 THE WTO AND SOUTH AFRICA'S DISPERSAL OF STATE 
POWERS AND COMPETENCIES 
11 central feature of South Africa's new constitutional dispensation is the 
vertical dispersal of powers between the different spheres of government, at 
national. provincial and local levels, In addition there has been a limited 
horizontal dispersal of powers at the national level to state institutions whose 
independence from the national government is constitutionally guaranteed, 
such as the Reserve Bank,' The overall effect of this dispersal of powers is 
6 S 211 (2) ot the Constitution, 
7 See Jackson Davey & Sykes 1995: 295, 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
that the national government, both the executive and Parliament, is no 
longer the supreme master of the country. Yet, the national executive, in 
negotiating an international agreement, and the national Parliament in 
ratifying such an agreement, binds the Republic, including the provinces. If 
a ratified agreement impinges on a province's functional areas of concurrent 
or exclusive legislative competence, is it in violation of the Constitution 
and thus invalid? This poses the question of how does South Africa's 
constitutional scheme of the dispersal of powers fits in with its WTO 
obligations? 
This very issue lies at the moment before the Indian Supreme Court. The 
states of Rajasthan. Orissa and Tamil Nadu have Challenged the Union 
government's accession to the WTO agreement on the basis that the 
agreement affects their exclusive constitutional powers and forces them to 
share power with the Union in violation of the basic structure of the 
Constitution. The thrust of the argument is that the treaty-making power of 
the Union may dissolve Indian federalism. To date the Indian Supreme Court 
has not yet pronounced on the issue.' 
3.1 WTO Rules 
Of the founding members of the GATT in 1947 a number were federations. 
for instance the United States of America, Canada and Australia. They 
insisted on a 'federal clause' on the argument that in a federal system the 
central government did not have the constitutional power to control 
subnational governments with regard to fiscal and other measures. 'O The 
same arguments prevailed at the Uruguay Rounds. Both the 1947 GATT and 
the WTO thus cater for countries with federal arrangements in a limited 
manner. 
3.1.1 GATT 1947 
The 1947 GATT contained the follOWing provision in Article XXIV: 12 
"Each party shall take reasonable measures as may be available to it 
to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the and local 
governments and authorities within its territories." 
In the panel decisions that followed a restrictive interpretation was 
this clause. In a complaint brought by South Africa against Canada, LJ,-,'~ac"",-, 
the province of Ontario refused to allow the selling of Kruger rands, the Panel 
Report' (which was nor adopted because of the veto by Canada) the 
purpose of Article XXIV: 12 as the following: 
"to qualiFy the basic obligation to ensure the observance of the General Agreement 
by regional .i:md local governments In the case of contracting with a federal 
structure" I. 
9 See Dhavan & Goel 1998: 54. 
10 Jackson Davey & Sykes 1995: 323. 
i I "Canada Measures Affecting Sale of Gold Coins" Li5863 unadapted report I 7 September 
1985 §§ 53. 










































GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
It allows states to accede to the General Agreement without having to change 
their federal distribution of competencies, In view of its drafting history, 
Article XXIV applied, the Report reads, 
"only to those measures taken at the regional or local level which the federal 
government cannot control because they fall outside its jurisdiction under the 
constitutional distribution of competence, ,,11 
In this regard Article XXIV: 12 is an exception to the general principle that a 
party to a treaty may not invoke its internal laws as a justification for not 
performing a treaty obligation, To minimise the impact of this exception 
because of the undue imbalance it can cause between unitary and Federal 
states' obligations, 'granting a special right to federal States without giving an 
offsetting privilege to unitary States'," Article XXIV:12 must be interpreted 
narrowly: it does not exempt subnational units from the application of the 
GATT obligations; it merely limits the obligation of federal states to secure the 
implementation of the provisions by subnational units, 
'Whether a member has taken 'reasonable measures' to secure compliance 
by subnational units of the GATT obligations, is an objective question. A 1988 
Panel Repon'c found that a member state had to demonstrate to other 
contracting parties that it had taken all reasonable measures available and 
that it would then be for the other contracting parties to decide whether that 
was the case. 
3.1.2 GATT 1994 
During the Uruguay Rounds Article XXIV: 12 was also subject to negotiations. 
Some countries sought its repeal while federal states again asserted the 
importance of its inclusion, In the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV in GATT 1994, the following gloss was given to subarticle 12: 
" 1 3, Each member is fully responsible under GATT 1994 for the observance of 
all provisions of GATT 1 994, and shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to it to ensure such observance by regIonal and local governments and 
authorities within its territory, 
14, The provision of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and 
apphed by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked in respect of 
measures affecting its observance taken by regional or local governments or 
authorities within the territory of a Member. When the Settlement Body 
has ruled that a provISion of GATT has not been observed, responsible Mem-
ber shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to It to ensure its 
observance, The provisions relating to compensation and suspension of conces-
sions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been pOSSIble to secure 
such observance. 
13 § 56. 
14 § 63, 
15 See also "Canada Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial 
Marketing Agencies· Panel Report DSI7/R, adopted 18 February 1992: "United States Meas-
ures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages" Panel Report DS23IR. adopted 19 June 1992. 
16 "Canada Import. Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial 
Marketing Agencies" Li6304 adopted on 22 March 1988. 










































15. Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford 
adequate opportunity for consultation representations made by 
another Member concerning measures operation of GATT 1994 
taken within the territory of the former." 
Although the general principle of Article XXIV: 12 is reiterated, the scope of 
its application appears to have been significantly reduced. The dispute 
settlement provisions in Articles XXII and XXIll may be invoked for violations 
by a subnational unit. If the Dispute Settlement Body has ruled that there has 
been a violation, the responsible member state must take such reasonable 
measures available to it to ensure its observance. However, in the 1994 
Understanding on A'rticle XXIV: 12 the matter is taken a step further. Where 
it is not possible for a member state to secure observance of the Dispute 
Resolution Body's ruling, the provisions relating to compensation and 
suspension of concessions or other obligations apply. The effect is that a 
country as a whole may be subject to enforcement measures, although only 
one part of it is in default of the GATT obligations. Indirectly, then, a 
subnational unit is bound by the obligations taken on by its national state. 
3.1.3 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
The existence of sub national units and other independent bodies in the 
constitutional arrangements of member states is also recognised in other 
agreements under the WTO although for different purposes. 
The GATS contains a provision similar to that of Article XXIV: 12 of GATT 
94. Article 1:1 of GATS provides that the Agreement applies to all 'measures 
by Members affecting trade in services', which include measures taken by -
"(i) central. regional or local governments and authorities; and 
Oi) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central. 
regional or local governments or authorities." 
Again, the duty of the member state is to take 'such reasonable measures as 
may be available to it to ensure their observance by' these subnational 
authorities within its territory. 
The reference to non-governmental bodies with delegated state power, is 
significant because it gives recognition to the fact that in many countries the 
decentralisation of state power to professional bodies or autonomous 
statutory bodies is an important aspect of state regulation in a modern state. 
It is important to note that reference is made to 'delegated' powers of non-
governmental organisations. It indicates that, unlike constitutionally 
entrenched federal powers, these powers can be revoked by the national 
government. Yet, member states are given the leeway of not doing so in 
recognition of the organisation of the modern state; the dispersal of functions 
and powers also to non-government bodies. Because of the importance of 
the autonomy of such bodies from the central government, the obligation of 
member states is not to bring their laws in conformity with the GATS 
obligations by doing away with bodies with relative autonomy, bur to 
accommodate them within the system of trade liberalisation. 
3.1.4 The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
Subnational entities also feature prominently in the pluri-Iateral GPA under 










































GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
the exception, the aim of the GPA is specifically to bind these subnational 
units into the liberalisation of government procurement. 
The first step in this direction was taken in I 979 when a number of signifi-
cant countries signed the 1979 GATT Government Procurement Code. ls The 
Code applied only to central government procurement of certain goods. The 
subsequent negotiations during the Uruguay Rounds resulted in the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), one of the pluri-Iateral 
agreements applicable only to the signatories." The new agreement now 
covers not only goods but also construction contracts and procurement of 
services. Induded in principle are subnational units and government-owned 
utility companies. Attached to each contracting party's accession to the Agree-
ment, is Appendix I containing a list of entities, both at national and sub-
national level that are bound by the Agreement. The lists of quasi-public 
institutions and enterprises are instructive regarding both the large number 
and array of such institutions. The US offer extends to specific procure-
ment by 37 of the 51 states and federally owned utility companies only to 
bidders from Korea, Israel and Hong Kong, becuase the US was not satisfied with 
other countries's offers of subnational and government-owned companies.:: 
These provisions in the WTO agreements highlight two important devel-
opments in international law First, the reality that faces international law is 
that in the case of many contracting parties, the national executive (or even 
the national legislature in case of ratification), is no longer the all-powerful 
body which rules that country. Power has been dispersed both vertically and 
horizontally. Second, the nature of international law obligations has also 
changed; no longer is it dealing with countries as actors regulating behaviour 
between them, but focus on how first, countries treat their own citizens 
through the various human rights instruments, and now, second, how a 
citizen of one country can do business in another country for the maximisa-
tion if his or her own profits In both cases domestic law and regulation 
become the focus of attention, but the central state who contracts with other 
countries, cannot as a matter of law (and often as policy), ensure conformity 
of domestic law with international obligations so contracted. 
3.2 Dispersal of state powers and competencies in South Africa 
The WTO's 'federal clause' can have important implications for South Africa, 
because under the new constitutional dispensation, powers traditionally 
located in central government have been dispersed in two directions; first, 
vertically between national. provincial and local sphere of government; and 
second, horizontally between the central government and other constitu-
tional bodies which with a measure of independence from the 
government. Notably in this context is the Reserve Bank. Apart from the 
formal constitutional picture, there are also numerous statutory bodies which 
18 See generally Dennin & Boucher 1995. 
19 The signatories are USA, Canada. Finland. Israel. Japan. Korea. Sweden. Norway. 
SWHzerland. 
20 Appendix I. 
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operate with a large degree of autonomy. Although their powers are subject 
to the will of Parliament, they are nevertheless given a broad discretion in 
their area of competence. 
The question is, then, to what extent, if any. the constitutional dispersal of 
powers in South Africa will bring the 'federal clauses' into operation. 
3.2. t Provinces 
Trade in goods and even services falls certainly within the functional 
competence of provinces. Their regulation of trade would. however. be 
indirect. 
Provinces play an important role in the area of trade, primarily with regard 
to goods, but to a lesser extent in services. Functional areas concurrently 
exercised with the national government, include trade, industrial promo-
tion. provincial public enterprises. and agriculture. Other functional areas of 
concurrent jurisdiction that may impact indirectly on trade are consumer 
protection and environment. Functional areas of exclusive provincial 
legislative competence, are but be significant. They include 
abattoirs, liquor licences and veterinary 
The question is. then, whether provinces, in their legislative and 
executive powers, could impinge on WTO obligations. More directly, can 
they impose tariffs or other measures which result in unfair competition? 
The main concern of the GATT has been the lowering of' tarifFs. In this area 
provinces have no power to levy any tariffs on the importation of goods. 
Section 228(1 )(a) of the Constitution provides that a provincial legislature 
may impose 'taxes, levies and duties other than. customs duties'. The 
direct mposition of customs duties in the form of tariffs is thus not permissi-
ble. The imposition of levies or duties could, however, be to the same effect. 
In this regard the conclusive answer to provinces venturing in the area is that 
section 228(2) provides that the power to impose taxes, levies, or duties, 
which in any event must be regulated by an Act of Parliament, 'may not be 
exercised in a way that materially and unreasonably prejudices national 
economic poliCies'. Commitments under the WTO would certainly constitute 
national economic policy and levies and duties contrary to WTO commit-
ments would prejudice such a policy. 
The second string to the WTO bow is to ensure that, in the absence of 
tariff impositions, there are no internal measures which distort international 
trade. Take two examples. In order to promote industrial development, a 
schedule 4 concurrent competence, a province could indulge in an array of 
subsidisation activities, producing, unfairly, a competitive local product for 
the international market. The second example would be in exercising a 
schedule 5 exclusive competency, say, of regulating the granting of liquor 
licences, with stipulations which would inhibit the sale of foreign wines in the 
Western Cape. 
22 Listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution. 
23 Listed In Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 










































GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
In the case of non-compliance by a province in an area which falls within 
a functional area of concurrent competence, national legislation may readily 
override such provincial legislation. National legislation prevails over pro-
vinCial legislation on a number of grounds. The most .likely ground to be used 
in the override provisions is section 146(3). In terms of this section national 
legislation prevails over provincial legislation if it is 
"aimed at preventing unreasonable action by a province that, 
(a) IS prejudicial to the economic ... interest of the country as a whole; or 
(b) impedes the implementation of national economIC policy." 
Where a province's measure may lead to the suspension of concessions 
against the country as a whole, national prejudice has been established and 
a strong case can be made out for the override provision. Similar, non-
compliance with WTO obligations, which also apply to provincial govern-
ments, impedes the implementation of a national economic policy as 
evidenced by the country's membership of the WTO. The failure of the 
national government not to take such actions would indicate that it has not 
taken 'reasonable measures' to ensure compliance. 
Other override grounds that may be relied upon are that the national 
legislation prevails if it is necessary for 'the maintenance of economic unity' 
or 'the protection of the common market respect of the mobility of goods, 
[and] services'.·c 
Where the provincial measure falls within the exclusive provincial legisla-
tive competence of schedule 5, the same grounds as above apply. Parliament 
may intervene in this area when it is necessary 'to prevent unreasonable 
action taken by a province which is prejudicial to ... the country as a 
whole'. Again, the prospect of the suspension of concessions and other 
measures against the country as a whole, will constitute prejudice to the 
country as a whole. 
3.2.2 Localgovernment 
As far as local government is concerned, trade and related matters do not 
appear to fall within the ambit of its powers Where they do in an indirect 
manner, however, there are also override provisions which would invalidate 
local by-laws that are in conFlict with WTO obligations. 
3.2.3 Other non-governmental organisations with delegated state 
power 
Other non-governmental organisations (used in the narrow sense as not 
being part of the national executive), which are given a measure of discretion 
in their area of operation and function with a degree of autonomy, may have 
an important role to play in ensuring compliance with WTO obligations. 
---~.--
25 S 1 46(2)(c)(ii) and (iii) of the Constitution 
26 S 44(2) of the Constitution. 
27 See Pan B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
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At the hearing before the Portfolio Committee on the ratification of South 
Africa's commitments under GATS, three officials were present, representing 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Reserve Bank and the 
Financial Services Board respectively. The presence of the latter two is 
significant. While the main negotiations were conducted by the DTI, the 
other two institutions were nevertheless involved. In this case the three 
institutions were at idem that the commitments in the offer were not more 
than what was reflected in current South African law. 
Unanimity of opinion may not always be present among key state actors. 
This raises the question of the autonomy of the Reserve Bank and that of the 
Financial Services Board. The Reserve Bank, 'in pursuit of its primary 
objective', the protection of 'the value of the currency in the interest of 
balanced and sustainable economic growth', 'must perform its functions 
independently and without fear, favour or prejudice,' but there must be 
regular consultation between the Bank and the Minister of Finance." Within 
its constitutionally protected area of competence, decisions of the national 
executive or the national Parliament cannot bind the Bank. This is recognised 
in the GATS, but WTO obligations would nevertheless not be thwarted by 
measures the Bank may take. While the Financial Services Board, a 
statutory body which does not enjoy constitutionally protected autonomy, 
has a measure of independence. In executing its duty of supervising the 
activities of financial institutions and financial services," it is duty-bound only 
to consult with the Minister of Finance in the exercise of its powers." 
Decisions are taken without government interference. Differences of opinion 
and policy between these institutions and the national government may 
emerge. including whether WTO obligations are being or should be met. 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
As far as the vertical dispersal of powers are concerned, the limited federal 
features contained in the Constitution, are unlikely to give rise to claims 
under Article XXIV: 12 of GATT or GATS. In so far as other non-governmental 
bodies are concerned. the dispersal of powers argument may well arise. 
However, the WTO may trump any 'federal' claim by allowing sanctions to 
be imposed against a country where one of its sub national units or non-
governmental agencies acts in violation of WTO obligations. The conflict 
must therefore be resolved within the domestic jurisdiction. In this regard 
intergovernmental relations, including dispute resolution mechanisms and 
procedures, have a critical role to play. 
29 'Explana[Ory Memorandum on the Tabling and Contents of South Africa: Schedule of 
SpeCific Commitments. which Reflect South Africa's Offer on Financial Services In the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO)', submitted [0 the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Trade 
and Industry 4 November 1998. 
30 S 224(1) of the Consntution 
31 S 224(2) of the Constitution. For a discussion on the independence of the Reserve Bank, see 
Davies 1996. 
32 EstablIshed by the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 
33 S 3(a) 










































GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
3.3 Domestic intergovernmental relations 
The fact that no autonomous trade regime in goods or services is possible for 
provincial or local governments, does not dispose of the matter. International 
trade regulation may impact profoundly on the well-being of provinces and 
local authorities. When the national government commits the country to 
obligations the impact of which will fall also on other spheres of government, 
it should be done within the context of intergovernmental relations and co-
operative governance. 
3.3. t South African Law 
One of the central principles of co-operative government, is the duty on 
'all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere', to co-
operate within another 'in mutual trust and good faith' by 'informing one 
another of. and consulting one another on, matrers of common interest'. 
Where WTO commitments made by the national executive may have far 
reaching consequences for provincial and local governments, a duty "falls on 
the national government both to inform and, more importantly, to consult 
with the other two spheres. Consultation entails that. before making a 
decision, the national government informs other interested parties of 
the pending decision, invites them to comment and considers such com-
ments in good faith. Such a duty should thus be discharged before the 
national government commences or concludes negotiations on various offers 
to WTO. 
3.3.2 South African practice 
In practice a number of state departments deal with WTO matters. The 
principal department is the Department of Trade and Industry. which has 
been responsible for GATT and WTO negotiations and has a permanent 
representative at the WTO. Another department directly involved is the 
Department of Agriculture in the light of the specific agreement on Agricul-
ture. The question is thus. how these national departments relate [0 their 
counterparts in the provinces. 
The present practices of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
~~."''''·vv, sound intergovernmental relations. at least as far as the provinces 
are concerned. The process of consultation with the provinces takes place 
through three monthly (,MINMEC) meetings between the Minister of Trade 
and Industry and the provincial Members of the Executive Councils (MECs) 
responSible of Economic Affairs. These meetings can thus serve both as a 
forum for information distribution as well as consultation. 
35 S 4 I (1 )(h)(iil) of the Constitution. See generally De Villiers 1997. 
36 Incidental to the problem of effective intragovemmental relations should also be mentioned. 
While the division of the national executive in depanments is constitutionally irrelevant. as 
all fall under Cabinet governance. the recent Presidential Review Commission Report 
Reform and Transformation of the Public Service (May 1998), indicates that there is. 
a lack of co-operation between departments Whether this also holds true for 
between the Departments of Trade and Industry and Agriculture. is unclear. A 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
The DTI has also included provincial representation in their delegation to 
WTO trade negotiations. With the first Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 
Singapore in December 1996, Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, 
invited two delegates from the provinces to accompany him and one MEC 
for Economic Affairs in the Eastern Mr Smuts Ngonyama, accompa-
nied him. At the second Ministerial in Geneva in April 1998, with 
the focus on the 50th celebration of the GATT/WTO, there was, however, no 
provincial representative. 
The Cinderella of the intergovernmental relations has been local government 
both in general as well as with respect to international trade. This is a serious 
omission as the impact of WTO obligations could be very drastic and acutely 
felt by a local authority. Where much of a town's economic base depends on 
a single industry or Factory, and tariff reductions affect such an industry or 
factory significantly to the point of closure, the impact falls on 
the locality with devastating effect on the local authority. Not only is the tax 
base of the municipality eroded, but increased unemployment places additional 
strains on its diminished resources. As some industries are concentrated in a 
few locations, consultations with those municipalities which could be affected 
by prospective WTO obligations should take place. Their non-voting participa-
tion in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP)" during the ratification 
hearings of WTO commitments, will be a case of a little too late. 
3.3.3 Other consultations 
Consultation has also occurred between the national government and its social 
partners in the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NED-
LAC)." With the first Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Singapore in 
December 1996, Minister Alec Erwin also included the general secretary of 
COSATU in his delegation. Labour was drawn in because the 'social clause' was 
on the agenda. Consultation with specific sectors of business and labour is 
also essential when commitments deal with specific sectors of the economy. 
4 CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND POWERS 
The final question to be addressed is whether WTO obligations may 
compromise or impede the implementation of specific constitutionally 
mandated policies. Specifically, would an affirmative action policy come into 
conflict with WTO obligations under any of its agreements? The issue was 
pertinently raised in the parliamentary ratification hearings on South Africa's 
commitments on the free trade in services, referred to above. The question 
then is whether the government's 'ten point plan' on affirmative action, 
based on a constitutional duty to rectify past injustices, comes into conflict 
with any WTO agreements, in particular the national treatment principle of 
non-discrimination. 
37 S 67 of the Cons[itUtion. 
38 See Davies 1996. 
39 See generally Schoenbaum 1997. 
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The pluri-Iateral Agreement on Government Procurement, although nor 
signed by South Africa, is a case in point. As pointed out earlier, the new 
agreement covers not only goods but also construction contracts and 
procurement of services, and included in principle are subnational units and 
government-owned utility companies. Unlike it predecessor, this Agreement 
does not incorporate the most favoured nation (MFN) principle, but works on 
the basis of reciprocity. 
Governments are the largest consumers of goods and services·: and 
through their procurement policies governments may give effect to various 
policies, including those which seek to promote disadvantaged groups within 
a country, Opponent to affirmative action policies argue that the principle of 
non-discrimination which is the basis of the Agreement," will be offended, 
because foreign goods cannot, by definition, qualify in terms of a preferable 
treatment policy for internal groups. One would have thought that a con-
clusive answer to this argument would be that all parties in a particular 
country, local as well as foreign, will be judged according to the same affirma-
tive action criteria. Foreign companies are in no different boat than other 
local companies which may be prejudiced by the preferential treatment policy. 
Judging from the conduct of the United State's government, this interpreta-
tion of the non-discrimination clause is not adopted. In the US schedule of 
commitments, it is explicitly stated that "this Agreement will nOt apply to 
set asides on behalf of small and minority businesses."43 The US states were 
equally explicit and stipulated that programmes "promoting the develop-
ment of distressed areas and businesses owned by minorities, disabled 
veterans and women are reserved from coverage,,,44 If these policies did not 
offend against the general principle of national treatment, why make these 
explicit reservations? It is either an overly cautious approach, or affirmative 
action policies offend against the general principle of non-discrimination, 
which must therefore be explicitly excluded to avoid a claim of non-
compliance. 
A second argument why affirmative action does not conflict with the non-
discrimination principle is that the WTO agreements themselves contain 
affirmative action provisions in the form of "special and differentiated" 
treatment provisions for developing and least developed countries. These 
and differential' measures include exemptions from some policy 
requirements and more generous time frames for implementation.'" The WTO 
41 Dennin & Boucher 1995 I. 
42 Article Ill: I reads: 
"With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government 
procurement covered by thiS agreemeru, each Party shaH provide immediately and uncondi-
tionally to the products and services and suppliers of other Parties offering products or 
services of the Parties treatmeru less favourable than: 
(al that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers: and 
(b) that accorded to products and suppliers of any other Party." 
43 General Notes para I. 
44 Appendix 2. 
45 See United Slates Reservations Appendix 2 1998: Thomas 1996: 64; Aghatise 1989. 
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trading system should recognise that specific policy initiatives such as affirma-
tive action, is aimed at achieving substantive equality which is a precondition 
for the full implementation of the principle of non-discrimination. 
In light of state practice, the conclusion is inevitable that it is not at all 
certain that affirmative action policies may not in the future be challenged 
by international companies trading in services. South Africa should thus 
include the principle as an exception to its general commitment to an open 
procurement policy, or, preferably, establish the principle of affirmative 
action as a general understanding of the relevant WTO obligation. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The WTO is an important step in the development of global governance. In 
the parlance of the South African Constitution, of the "fourth sphere of 
government" at the international level has been given a significant impetus. 
Increasingly nation states shed sovereignty to supranational institutions. This 
occurs at both a global and regional level. The European Union is the most 
advanced example where international law which governs relations between 
nation states has become part of the constitutional law of the member states. 
A similar process is envisaged by the various regional economic integration 
initiatives in Africa. What is important is that the dispersal of powers to 
international bodies, reflects the sovereign will. In the case of South Africa, 
this entails that the national executive must consult with Parliament before 
and during WTO trade negotiations. 
Portraying supranational governance as the "fourth sphere of government" 
not only reflects the actual distribution of power, but also emphasises the 
imperative of sound intergovernmental relations and cooperative government 
between all spheres. The four spheres are, in the words of the Constitution, 
'distinctive, interdependent and interrelated',4? and for effective government 
this requires co-operative governance. In particular the important principle of 
co-operative government, the duty to consult
48 
before decisions are effectively 
made, must be adhered to. This entails that in practice the national govern-
ment must, with regard to the WTO trade issues, consult with provincial and, 
where appropriate, also with local spheres of government. 
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